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Co-operating with the Neighbours: Regional
Planning in Hamburg and Toronto
PATRICIA PETERSENt

City-regions must compete globally-of this we are
continually reminded. Success in this world competition,
experts advise, depends on a region's ability "to develop a
shared set of values, formulate a common vision, and
mobilise resources to achieve it."1 This requires a shift in
focus-from institutions to process, from government to
governance. Focussing on process offers "a social learning
perspective (where society's members actively learn from one
another)" and demands "sensitivity to intricate process
detail."2 Sensitivity to intricate process detail describes
exactly the way in which politicians and civil servants in the
Hamburg Metropolitan Region (HMR) have tackled regional
planning since the early 1990s. Participants in the exercise
consider the process more important than the goal and
designed it so that all interests in the region would agree.
The process used in the HMR contrasts sharply with the
disjointed attempts to co-ordinate activity in the Greater
Toronto Area (GTA). One might argue that the success of the
process is evident in the result: the HMR has a detailed
regional plan covering nine policy areas, despite very
tProfessor of Political Science, Innis College, University of Toronto; M.A.
(Political Science), University of Toronto, 1978; Ph.D. (Political Science),
University of Toronto, 1985. I would like to thank the staff of the Office of the
Greater Toronto Area and the Greater Toronto Services Board, civil servants
and politicians of the City of Hamburg, and Dr. Gerd Brockmann, former mayor
of the city of Wedel who willingly and enthusiastically answered all my
questions regardless of how simple. I would also like to thank Dr. J&irgen
Mantell, chairman of the joint steering committee for the Hamburg Regional
Plan, for allowing me to attend some of their meetings. My compliments to the
Buffalo Law Review for the excellent work in organizing and hosting the
Symposium on Regionalism in March 1999.
1. Allan D. Wallis, Regions in Action: Crafting Regional Governance Under
the Challenge of Global Competitiveness, NATL CIVIC REV., Spring-Summer
1996, at 19.
2. Ian Wight, DeconstructingRegionalism, PLAN CANADA, May 1998, at 31,

32.
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complicated intergovernmental relations in the region. The
GTA has yet to formulate a plan for any policy area. The
question is-can such a process be replicated in North
America? The two case studies in this paper suggest this
may not be possible. Our Anglo-American political
institutions and traditions could not support the kind of
rational deliberation and attention to detail that is
necessary for this process to work. In short, we may not be
able to "formulate a common vision" for our regions.
I.

HAMBURG AND TORONTO

I chose the Hamburg and Toronto 3 regions to compare
because I was struck by similarities between them, as was
Hans Blumenfeld4 who had compared them in 1970. The
city of Hamburg is slightly larger in area than the city of
Toronto but has a slightly smaller population. Both cities
are at the centre of regions of similar populations, although
the HMR is more than double in area.
Toronto
630
2,357,378
Hamburg
755
1,705,872
Greater Toronto Area
7,061
4,484,583
Metropolitan Hamburg 18,110
3,996,698
Region
Source: Metropolregion Hamburg Datenspiegel, December
1997.
Both regions are important in the national and
international economy. Hamburg is the second largest city
in Germany and Europe's second largest port in terms of
annual tonnage. According to a report of the European
Union issued in 1996 the HMR is Europe's richest region
and "has bettered German national growth, on average by a
solid half point each year" since 1990.! The population of
the GTA is forty-two percent of Ontario's population and
fifteen and one-half percent of the population of Canada. It
3. Reference is to the present city of Toronto as created by provincial
legislation January 1, 1998. It encompasses the boundaries of the former
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (1954-1997).
4. See Hans Blumenfeld, Hamburg and Toronto: A Comparison, PLAN
CANADA, Dec. 1970, at 39.
5. Fat-cat-on-Elbe,THE ECONOMIST, June 29, 1996, at 50.
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is home to fifty percent of the Ontario labour force and
twenty percent of the Canadian labour force. Most
importantly, however, regional planning has been at the top
of the political agenda in the two regions since the late
1980s. Predictions of disaster surfaced periodically in both
cities if something was not done to improve government coordination in the region. "[I]n no other region in Germany
do state boundaries have such drastic consequences" a
government report on the HMR concluded in 1989.6
"[F]ailure to take bold steps", a Toronto newspaper warned
in 1995," may lead to... prosperous suburbs surrounding a
rotting core.... [W]e cannot ignore that frightening
prospect."'
Major differences exist between the two cities, however.
Population in the HMR has not grown significantly since
the end of the war, although it has experienced a major
shift in population, as Hamburg residents migrated to the
suburbs; a migration that began in the early 1960s.
Between the late 1960s and 1980 Hamburg shrank by
201,000 and the suburbs grew by 203,000. In contrast, the
population of Toronto and its outer suburbs has grown
substantially since the end of World War II. The population
in Toronto grew by 1.2 million from 1951 to 1994; the
population in the region grew by 3.1. million during the
same period. Another difference is that the development of
the suburbs around Hamburg was controlled by two major
plans. The first, designed in 1928 by Fritz Schumacher,
Hamburg's chief planner and architect, permitted land to
develop only along eight axes radiating out from the city.
The second plan regulated the density of the development
along these axes. The GTA still does not have a plan to
guide settlement in the region.
The most significant difference between the two regions
lies in the political structure of each. Government relations
in Ontario are much less complicated than those in
Hamburg. In the first instance, the GTA has fewer
governments. It encompasses twenty-five local and four
regional governments.8 It lies entirely within one province.
6. FRITz W. SCHARPF & ARTHUR BENZ, ZUSAMMENARBEIT ZWISCHEN DEN
NORDDEUTSCHEN LANDERN 5 (Max-Planck-Institut fir Gesellschaftsforschung,

1990).
7. William Walker, A New Vision for a City-State, THE TORONTO STAR,
Nov. 12, 1995, at B2.
8. There were thirty municipal and five regional governments prior to the

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

The HMR contains 250 municipal, seven county, and three
state governments. 9 Secondly, only one government-the
province of Ontario-has the constitutional authority to plan
for the GTA even though the plan would involve three
levels of government-provincial, regional, and municipal.
Four levels of governments share responsibility for regional
planning in the HMR-federal, state, county, and municipal.
All four have some constitutional authority for planning.
Federal legislation set the principles governing regional and
city planning." The states are responsible for regional and
conceptual plans dealing with city development. Municipal
governments prepare and approve the development plans
for specific areas of the city. To further complicate matters
in the region, the state of Lower Saxony has delegated its
responsibility for regional planning to its county
governments. Regional planning in the HMR involves many
unequal partners, all of who possess some constitutional
status in Germany. The Hamburg region has real border
problems.
A. Planningfor the HamburgMetropolitanRegion:
NegotiatingAway the Boundaries
In November 1991, the city-state of Hamburg signed a
trilateral agreement with the states of Schleswig-Holstein
and Lower Saxony to devise a plan for development in the
region for the next twenty years. The plan would cover a
wide range of government activities: land use planning,
environmental protection, recreation, waste disposal,
research, education, transportation, women's issues, and
economic development. The agreement entrusted the plan's
design to a joint steering committee comprised of civil
servants from the three state governments and municipal
civil servants representing the surrounding municipalities.
amalgamation of the governments in Metropolitan Toronto in 1998.
9. The HMR was enlarged in 1996 after the three states approved the
regional development plan. These numbers describe the region prior to this
date.
10. See, for example, DAs RAUMORDNUNGSGESSETZ (ROG) for regional
planning, and DAS BAUGESETZBUCH (BauGB) for all other planning powers. See
also GERD SCHMIDT-EICHSTAEDT, STADTEBAURECHT: EINFUHRUNG UND
HANDBUCH, (Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1993), for a description of the planning
powers of the various governments. Article 28 of the German Constitution
grants municipal governments authority to pass ordinances in areas of local
concern.
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The plan was completed in November 1996 and approved in
a joint cabinet meeting in December. The three states
agreed to base all future decisions affecting the region on
the policies. Further, they established three bodies
suggested by the committee to oversee the implementation
of the plan: a regional planning conference, a planning
board, and an executive steering committee. They also
directed this last committee to begin work on revising the
plan for the year 2000. The plan is a step in the right
direction, as Henning Voscherau, former mayor of Hamburg
noted, however, it "must still prove itself. The institutions
that have developed are comprehensible and appealing...
[blut will our grandchildren say one day they were usefulor at least-they did no harm?"'
The trilateral agreement signed in 1991 marked the
first time that the three states had agreed in writing to
work toward a comprehensive plan for the region, even
though border problems had existed for a long time. Of the
three states, Hamburg suffered the most from these
disputes. 2 Two factors had contributed to Hamburg's
problems: its limited amount of territory, and the growth in
its suburbs, which had begun in earnest in the early 1960s.
This "fat belt" (Speckgiirtel), as the Germans call it, today
contains some of Hamburg's wealthier taxpayers, business
and residential, who had been moving out of the city since
the late 1950s. As this suburban population grew, the gap
between the city's interests and those of the surrounding
municipal and state governments' widened. This intensified
conflicts over land use and infrastructure. Because its
territory is so small, Hamburg needs land in the suburbs to
carry out even its most basic governmental functions. It
needs land to dump garbage it cannot incinerate; it needs
land to dump the silt that it must dredge periodically from
the harbour to keep the port operating. The location of
infrastructure in the region, be it roads, railways, or
airports is also contentious, although all governments in
11. Suzanne von Bargen, Voscheraus Appell an den Norden: Mehr
Gemeinsamkeit, HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT (Jan. 22, 1999) <www.abendblatt.de>
(on file with author).
12. For a detailed description of the problems Hamburg faces see Patricia
Petersen, One Man's Meat is Another Man's Poison: The Disadvantages of
Being a City-State in the Federal Republic of Germany (1996), presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
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the region agree that improving the region's infrastructure
benefits the regional economy. Conflicts arose because the
location of the infrastructure affected the economy and
hence the revenues flowing into each state treasury.
An on-going battle between Hamburg and SchleswigHolstein over the construction of a new highway illustrates
this problem. Germany needs to build a new highway across
the Elbe River to connect eastern Germany and the Baltic
States with the West. Hamburg and Lower Saxony would
like the highway to cross the river directly east of Hamburg
where the river is narrower and the crossing would be
cheaper to build. Schleswig-Holstein wants the crossing to
be west of Hamburg in the hopes that it will improve the
economy of a poor, underdeveloped part of the state which
has no major highways. Hamburg's fear is that a crossing
west of the city would only make travelling easier between
eastern Germany and the Baltic States and Hamburg's
main economic rival, the port city of Rotterdam.
Suburban growth has cost the city in other ways.
Seventy-two percent of Hamburg's annual revenues come
from taxes; approximately fifty-two percent of this is income
tax. Federal legislation requires people to pay their income
tax to the state government in which they live and not to
the state in which they work. Many of the people who work
in Hamburg are suburban commuters. Because Hamburg is
so small, these commuters live in and pay taxes to another
state. Of the 900,000 jobs in the city, commuters fill
approximately 200,000. Hamburg is responsible for
collecting income taxes from these commuters, because they
work in Hamburg, but must hand them over to the state in
which they live. The government of Hamburg has argued
that it loses money each year because it has to transfer
revenues from these taxes to neighbouring states. This
amount has averaged 2.2 billion Deutsche mark annually
since at least 1991 and represents approximately seventeen
percent of the city's net annual revenues.13 State
governments also offer a number of services to residents
which are paid for out of general revenues. As the urban
centre for the region, Hamburg provides many municipal
and state services to suburban residents, such as hospitals,
13. For financial data on Hamburg see the financial report the Ministry of
Finance issues yearly as background to the annual operating and capital
budgets; see FREIE UND HANSESTADT HAMBURG, FINANZBERICHT 1998.
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universities, schools, and cultural facilities. These suburban
residents, however, pay taxes to another state. Hamburg is
in the costly predicament of providing expensive services to
people from whom it can collect no revenue.
Because the border between Hamburg and its suburbs
is both a city and a state boundary, co-operating with the
neighbours in the past had proved difficult. Bargaining
between Hamburg and the municipalities was awkward
because it occurred between unequal partners-the
suburban municipal governments and the city-state
government of Hamburg. Furthermore, the governments of
the two neighbouring states were never pleased to have
Hamburg negotiate with their municipalities without their
involvement as well, precisely because Hamburg was also a
state. Over the years, Hamburg had devised a wide variety
of methods to handle these disputes. In several instances
Hamburg simply by-passed the other governments. For
example, it controlled development in the suburbs by
buying the land itself or by lobbying the federal government
to withhold funds for infrastructure. It was more usual,
however, for Hamburg to work out some arrangement with
the neighbouring state, municipal, or county government.
This might be as informal as a quid pro quo that procured a
dumpsite for Hamburg and a new transportation line for
the agreeing municipality. Or these arrangements might
take the form of signed contracts with the governments of
individual municipalities or states for the sharing or buying
of services. Hamburg signed contracts with suburban
municipalities or states to allow their residents to use
special schools or hospitals. These contracts required the
governments to pay some of the costs of these facilities. A
number of special purpose bodies, run by the governments
involved, also exist to construct and operate specific
facilities such as water and sewage treatment plants,
incinerators, and the airport. The region has one transit
authority, the Hamburger Verkehrsverbund (HVV), to plan,
construct, and operate all public transportation, i.e., buses,
rail transit, subways. HVV membership comprised all the
governments providing public transit in the area-the
suburban municipalities and the two richest and strongest
members, Hamburg and the federal government.
There were problems, however, with all of these
arrangements. In the first instance, they could not be used
all of the time or for every issue. Hamburg may be able to
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buy land in the suburbs to keep it undeveloped, but had a
much harder time buying land in the suburbs to build
something the suburbs did not want-incinerators, garbage
dumps, or public housing. Suburban municipalities could
block these through their authority to approve development
plans. The city's ability to influence the federal government
fluctuated with party fortunes locally and federally. Often,
the special agencies the states created to build and operate
specific services were fought by municipalities that saw
these agencies as an encroachment on their jurisdiction.
Moreover, contracts designed to share services and costs
worked only when the rules for dividing costs and benefits
were clear, e.g. when operating costs were covered by user
fees. Those arrangements in which distribution of costs and
benefits had to be negotiated did not work as well.
The most damaging criticism of these multitudinous,
often ad hoc, arrangements was that they did nothing to
further planning and co-ordination of government activity
in the region. To rectify this the states had tried various
advisory forums over the years to discuss common
problems. The most successful in the past had been the two
regional planning councils that Hamburg established with
each of its neighbour states in the mid-1950s. These
councils comprised the heads of the state governments,
government ministers, and senior civil servants. Each
council produced a plan for the development of the territory
under its jurisdiction following Fritz Schumacher's original
plan of 1928. The regional planning councils administered a
structural fund (F6rderfond)to help implement these plans.
Each state contributed fifty percent of the money to the
fund. The structural funds were of some benefit for they
helped to co-ordinate activity in the region. It soon became
apparent, however, that the serviced land they made
available in the suburbs was drawing people and businesses
out of the city. Hamburg's contribution to the funds
understandably dwindled. The government of Hamburg was
no longer interested in contributing to a fund that was
hurting the city. The regional planning councils themselves
also suffered from a number of weaknesses-they had no
authority, outside of the authority to spend money on
infrastructure, and no administrative staff. In addition,
municipal governments were not involved in council
discussions, yet often they were the ones responsible for
implementing council recommendations. Furthermore, the
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most tangible areas of co-operation usually involved only
Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg and not the whole region.
Lower Saxony was less willing to participate because it was
not as dependent upon Hamburg's suburbs for state tax
revenues.
By early 1991, it had become clear to all governments in
the region that the opportunities for economic development
presented by the reunification of Germany and the
strengthening of the European Union through the Treaty of
Maastricht made co-ordinating government activities
imperative. The losses for not agreeing would now be much
greater. Hamburg and its suburbs were no longer at the
edge of Europe; German reunification and the end of the
cold war had turned the region into a major crossroads for
European trade. The amount of east-west traffic passing
through Hamburg had begun to increase now that the
impenetrable border forty kilometres east of the city had
disappeared. Most of the goods that had previously sailed
from Rostock on the Baltic, East Germany's only major
port, would now leave from Hamburg because its port was
more efficient and closer to the Atlantic. Roads, railway
lines, and port facilities needed to be improved if the
greater Hamburg region was to benefit from these changes.
This prospect of expanded development in the region
prompted the state governments to sign the trilateral
agreement in late 1991. The agreement had been suggested
by
two
experts
in
intergovernmental
relations
commissioned by Hamburg to "improve the search for
acceptable solutions"14 to these disputes. It had been
discussed extensively with the regional chambers of
commerce, industry, and artisans, with the north German
branch of the German Federation of Trade Unions, and
with the lower levels of governments in the region before
being approved. The agreement specified a process for
developing the plan that would transform the existing
"state-centred" negotiating, where each participant was
interested only in what is best for a particular political unit,
to "common good" negotiating, where participants would
negotiate as if there were no state boundaries. For this
reason the steering committee of civil servants charged
with this task was given the authority to negotiate and vote
on specific items in the plan without having to obtain the
14. SCHARPF & BENZ, supranote 6, at 39.
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approvalof their respective governments first.15
Between 1991 and 1996 the plan's steering committee
produced a concept for the region," detailed policies in ten
areas of government activities (housing, conservation and
agriculture,
economic
development,
transportation,
recreation, water, waste disposal, harbour sludge, energy,
and land use planning), and three governmental bodies to
oversee the implementation of these policies. 7 The state
cabinets approved all of these in December 1996 with no
amendments. At the same time the cabinets directed the
steering committee to review the plan and report back with
changes for a new plan for the year 2000. The region needed
a new plan primarily because the state cabinets had been
forced to expand the boundaries of the region at the same
time they approved the plan. Several counties in Lower
Saxony who had been left out of the region initially insisted
on being included, as they realised the advantages this
would bring them. They had threatened to use their
authority
over
regional
planning
to block
the
implementation of the plan, if they were excluded. 8
The success of the plan depends on the willingness of all
governments to adhere to its policies, because no
government in the region has the authority to impose it on
any of the others. Therefore, all governments had to be
involved in the entire planning process. Membership on the
plan's steering committee and on each of the nine policy
committees struck to hammer out detailed policies
comprised representatives from the executive branches of
the state, municipal, and county governments. Moreover,
the steering committee consulted extensively with
important stakeholder groups-chambers of commerce,
industry and trades, environmental associations, farmers'
unions, civil service unions, and the political parties. Two
municipal associations, representing the municipalities in
Hamburg's neighbour states, also advised the nine policy
15. Interview with Niels Jonas, Chief Negotiator of Hamburg, in Hamburg
(May 1996).
16. See FREE UND HANSESTADT HAMBURG, Niedersachsen, REGIONALES
ENTWICKLUNGSKONZEPT FOR DIE METROPOLREGION
ORIENTIERUNGSRAHMEN (1994).

HAMBURG: LEITBILD UND

17. See Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Schleswig-Holstein,
Handlungsrahmen-Regionales Entwicklungskonzept fir die Metropolregion
Hamburg, Hamburg, Hannover, Kiel: 1996.
18. Interview with Jens Lattmann, Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg,
Senatskanzlei-Planungsstab, in Hamburg (Dec. 1998).
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committees. The consultations with these stakeholder
groups produced numerous amendments to the draft
policies.
The structure of the three institutions created to
oversee the plan reflects the need to convince governments
of its legitimacy. A planning board comprised of members of
the executive branch of state and local governments sets
policy. It receives advice from a regional planning
conference that meets biannually. Conference members
come from the state legislatures and representatives of
specific interests groups, such as the chambers of
commerce, industry, and artisans and labour unions. An
executive steering committee of civil servants from state
and local governments implements the policies mainly
through two committees, one for Hamburg-SchleswigHolstein and one for Hamburg-Lower Saxony, which decide
on the allocation of structural funds. The steering
committee also mediates in disputes involving the state
governments.
It is too early to judge the success of the plan, however,
the governments are co-operating in a number of areas.
Two of the most contentious areas in which agreement has
been reached are social housing and public transportation.
Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein signed an agreement in
late 1994 to share equally the cost of funding social housing
built by the Schleswig-Holstein municipalities in the
Hamburg region. Fifty percent of the units will be reserved
for Hamburg residents. The two states also have signed an
agreement to change the funding and structure of the HVV,
which operates public transit in the region. The policy
committees that had negotiated these arrangements had
faced strong resistance from the municipal governments
responsible for implementing all or part of these policies.
Suburban municipalities feared that Hamburg would use
the housing agreement to export its slums to the suburbs.
Some municipalities were worried that under a regional
transportation association they would be responsible for the
transportation debts incurred by poorer, or less efficient,
municipal governments. Agreement in these areas was
reached in part because the state governments were willing
to accommodate these concerns in the final agreements.
More important, perhaps, were the external pressures on
the governments, both state and municipal, to reach a
compromise. Suburban governments must provide housing
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for their growing population; they cannot do this without
financial aid because the cost of land and labour is too high
for them to build alone. The reform of the German railway
system in 1995 which delegated responsibility for regional
rail transportation to the state governments, plus several
recent regulations of the European Union governing rail
transportation made reform of the public transportation
system in the region mandatory by January 1996. Whether
agreement can be reached in other areas without such
external pressure is difficult to judge. However, municipal
officials in the region continue to press their state
governments to uphold the policies in the plan. At their
insistence, the regional planning conference has added two
new policy areas; job training, and research and
development to the plan, and is considering adding labour,
health and social services.
Despite support for the plan, three main sources of
tension still exist. Tensions arise occasionally between the
state ministries responsible for planning and those
responsible for specific functions, e.g. transportation or
housing. Tensions also occur in regional land use planning
because different levels of governments in the three states
handle this function. Most serious, however, are the
tensions that still occur between the states over specific
issues, especially those that shift economic power. There is
always conflict in the region when money is involved.
Political confrontation between Schleswig-Holstein and
Hamburg over two decisions-Hamburg closing its schools
to suburban children and Schleswig-Holstein publicly
announcing its support for new a highway across the Elbe
west of Hamburg-erupted suddenly in early 1995, making
headlines and taking members of the committee negotiating
the original plan by surprise. This kind of behaviour
continues to complicate the work of the regional planning
bodies. In 1998, tension arose between Hamburg and
Schleswig-Holstein when they clashed over the construction
of a large furniture store. Originally the two states had
opposed the construction of the store in a SchleswigHolstein suburb adjacent to Hamburg because it would
draw customers away from Hamburg's downtown and
destroy part of the green belt designated in the regional
plan. The suburban government referred the issue to the
regional plan's steering committee for mediation. Before the
steering committee had decided on the issue, Hamburg
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approved the construction of similar furniture in Hamburg
across the border from the proposed location of the
suburban store.
Despite these tensions, members of the joint regional
planning committee remain optimistic. One reason for this
optimism is their belief that the institutions created to
produce and oversee these regional policies encourage cooperative behavior. They do this by building trust among
the
governments.
Participation,
continuity,
and
transparency are essential to building this trust: every
government in the region participates in the process; those
involved in the negotiations remain the same, and
committee membership does not change with each meeting;
finally, everyone involved in the process is kept fully
informed. The institutions created to oversee the plan, the
planning board, the regional planning conference, and the
executive steering committee continue the consensual
approach used to arrive at the comprehensive regional plan.
Negotiators believe that this venture in planning for
regional development will lead to an understanding of the
problems each government faces and, more importantly, to
a realisation that, in the words of one suburban mayor, "we
have interests as a region that make co-operation
unavoidable." 9
B. Regional Planningin the GTA: EncouragingCooperationin the Region
In late 1998, the province of Ontario established a
service board for the Greater Toronto Area and entrusted it
with the management of the provincial transit authority in
the GTA. The board is comprised of mayors and councillors
from the local councils in the region. The provincial
government created the Greater Toronto Services Board
partly to reduce provincial involvement in public transit, an
issue that it considered to be purely local. The province also
hopes, however, that the new board will improve cooperation between municipal governments in the region
and eventually produce a plan to co-ordinate services and
development in the region. All previous attempts by
provincial governments since the late 1960s to encourage
planning and co-ordination between municipalities in the
19. Interview with Gerd Brockmann, Mayor of Wedel, in Wedel (May 1996).
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region have failed.
The greatest growth in Ontario's population and
industry since the end of WWII has occurred in the
southern part of the province along the shoreline of Lake
Ontario. This uneven development increased the economic
and social differences between northern and southern
Ontario. Although the provincial government was willing to
tolerate some variances between the regions, it did not
want a sharp division between the two in identities and
values. To counter this, the Ontario government issued a
series of policy papers on regional planning for the entire
province entitled Design for Development.2" Design for
Development was meant to guide decisions of provincial
ministries and local governments in order to distribute
population and economic activities optimally across the
province. No sanctions were included in the policy, however,
if a ministry or local government failed to adhere to it. The
government also created six additional regional
governments 1 in the southern part of the province and
delegated to them the authority to approve land use plans.
The province hoped that the regional governments would
make regional planning easier. In practice, however, the
regional councils had little influence over planning. The
authority for zoning by-laws and subdivisions remained
with the local councils who guarded these powers jealously.
Because the members of regional councils were local
councillors appointed by their own councils, they were
reluctant to impose regional plans on those who had
appointed them. Consequently, spending by provincial
ministries which was based on ministerial priorities
determined the character of growth in the GTA. This was
20. See Ontario, Ministry of Treasury, Economics, and Intergovernmental
Affairs, Designfor Development, Ontario'sFuture:Trends and Options (Toronto:
The Branch, 1976); Ontario, Ministry of Treasury, Economics, and
Intergovernmental Affairs, Southern Ontario Strategy PositionPaper2: Trends,
Commitments and Choices (Toronto: The Ministry, 1975); Ontario, Ministry of
Treasury, Economics, and Intergovernmental Affairs, Southern Ontario
Strategy Position Paper: Prelude to Development Strategy (Toronto: The
Ministry,
1974);
Ontario,
Ministry
of Treasury, Economics,
and
Intergovernmental Affairs, Southern Ontario Strategy Phase 1 Report, First
Draft, Summary (Toronto: The Ministry, 1973); Ontario, Ministry of Treasury,
Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs, A Background Paper on
Management of Growth:A Regional Perspective (Toronto: The Ministry, 1973).
21. Metropolitan Toronto, the first regional government, was created in
1954.
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especially true of spending on infrastructure, and in
particular, on two main trunk water and sewer systems
built in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which allowed the
development
of "wall to wall housing to the east and north
of,,22
of Toronto.
Regional planning in the GTA beyond
ministry spending decisions remained a dream.
By the middle of the 1980s, it had become apparent to
provincial staff in the Premier's Office and in most
ministries that issues in this region were absorbing an
increasingly large portion of their time. Growth in the area
was chaotic and becoming expensive for the government to
service. To bring this growth under control, staff in the
Ministry of Municipal Affairs created two informal
committees of civil servants whose purpose it was to keep
local governments informed about provincial activities in
the region. The first was a committee of chief
administrative officers of regional and local municipalities
in the GTA, which later became known as the Greater
Toronto Co-ordinating Committee (GTCC); the second was a
committee of assistant deputy ministers from ministries
most active in the area-Agriculture, Community and Social
Services, Education, Environment, Government Services,
Health, Housing, Management Board, Municipal Affairs,
Natural Resources, Transportation, and Treasury. Then in
1988, the premier of the province created a special office for
the region called the Office of the Greater Toronto Area
(OGTA). It was headed by its own deputy minister who
reported to the Minister of Municipal Affairs. Responsibility
for the GTCC was handed over to the OGTA soon after it
was established. The OGTA's mandate was to monitor the
disposal of solid waste (Toronto was running out of landfill
sites), major highway and transit projects, sewers, water,
and urban intensification and redevelopment. Those were
its short-term goals. Its long-term goal was to maintain the
Greater Toronto Area as a good place to live and work.
Between 1989 and 1994, the OGTA and the GTCC
produced a number of studies for public discussion dealing
with the region's future. Some of these were produced by
planning consultants. Other plans were written by working
committees assigned to specific policy areas: infrastructure,

22. Telephone Interview with Gardner Church, former Deputy Minister and
First Head of the Office of the Greater Toronto Area (Jan. 23, 1999) (discussing
the South Peel Water and Sewer System and the York-Durham Sewer System).
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urban form, economic vitality, countryside, investment
planning and financing mechanisms, and human and social
development. Committees were comprised of provincial and
municipal staffs who were specialists in these fields. The
government hoped that these studies "would isolate the
major issues which require discussion prior to decisions
being made by all levels of government.... [and] would
move towards a collective understanding by municipalities
and the public as to future actions."23
All the studies identified the same problems-severe
congestion, expensive infrastructure, loss of farmland and
natural areas, and the same culprit-sprawl, especially in
the region outside the city of Toronto. This pattern of
settlement, typical of North American urban growth, was
damaging both the economy and the environment. It was
the product of a mentality that defined the countryside as
"'undeveloped' land awaiting some form of 'higher and
better' land use."24 Sprawl increased the costs of providing
infrastructure in the region. It made public transit more
expensive, thereby increasing traffic on the roads. This in
turn increased pollution and the cost to businesses of
moving goods. Toronto had become a bottleneck in the eastwest movement of traffic across the province. It was
particularly important to stop this pattern of development
now as demographers had forecast that the population in
the GTA would grow by almost another two million by 2021.
All of the reports supported a more compact form of
23. Ontario, Ministry of the Environment, Office of the Greater Toronto
Area, Shaping Growth in the GTA, at 4 (Toronto: Berridge Lewinberg
Greenberg Ltd., 1992) [hereinafter Shaping Growth in the GTA]; see also
Ontario, Ministry of the Environment, Office of the Greater Toronto Area, GTA
2021 - The Challenge of Our Future (Toronto: The Office, 1992); Ontario,
Greater Toronto Co-ordinating Committee, Countryside Working Group, A
Vision for the Countryside, at 4 (Toronto: 1992) [hereinafter Countryside
Working Group]; Ontario, Infrastructure Working Group, GTA 2021 Infrastructure(Toronto: The Group, 1992) [hereinafter Infrastructure Working
Group]; Ontario, Municipal Economic Vitality Working Group, Sustainable
Economic Growth (Toronto: The Group, 1992); Ontario, Provincial-Municipal
Human and Social Development Working Group, Planning for People and
Communities (Toronto: The Group, 1992); Ontario, Provincial-Municipal
Investment Planning and Financing Mechanism Working Group, Meeting the
Challenge (Toronto: The Group, 1992); Ontario, Urban Form Working Group,
Urban Form: Bringing the Vision into Focus (Toronto: The Group, 1992);
Ontario, IBI Group Consultants, Greater Toronto Area Urban Structure
Concepts Study (Toronto: 1989).
24. Countryside Working Group, supranote 23, at 1.
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development and they all recommended "greater provincial
leadership in the achievement of these goals."25
As the Canadian economy worsened in the early 1990s,
the emphasis in regional planning for the GTA shifted from
reducing sprawl to improving the economy. In January
1995, the GTCC issued the first of two reports on finances
in the region that described a GTA battered because it was
losing a significant amount of provincial revenues to other
regions in the province. Under pressure from the media
and an impending election, the provincial government
appointed a small task force of disinterested citizens in
April 1995 to recommend ways of ensuring "that the heart27
of the GTA remains strong and economically vibrant."
Specifically, it was to address "the property tax crisis," to
"provide direction for the future governance of the GTA,"
and to "answer the fundamental questions our citizens are
asking. 2 ' The OGTA served as administrative staff to the
task force. The life of the task force was shortened from
eighteen to eight months immediately after the government
that had appointed it was defeated in the election in June
1995.
The report of the GTA Task Force, released in February
1996, reiterated the problems detailed in previous studies:
the GTA lacked an integrated transportation plan;
congestion was severe and particularly heavy along regional
boundaries; the Regional Municipality of York did not have
natural access to the water in Lake Ontario and this
skewed development there. The report also noted some new
concerns which, it argued, were hurting the region's
economy: an outdated assessment system, a complicated
and lengthy process for approving development, and
competition
between
municipalities
for
economic
development which undermined the ability of the GTA "to
speak with a single, identifiable voice". The outdated
assessment system was creating special problems, for it had
25. Shaping Growth in the GTA, supra note 23, at 48.
26. Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Office of the
Greater Toronto Area, Greater Toronto Co-ordinating Committee, Rethinking
the Fundamentals:Provincial-LocalFinances in the GreaterToronto Area, at 1
(Toronto: 1995).
27. Walker, supra note 7, at A7.
28. Ontario, GTA Task Force, Greater Toronto, at 9 (Toronto: 1996)
[hereinafter GTA Task Force].
29. Id. at 67.
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produced a tax gap within the GTA that made
municipalities outside Toronto more attractive as locations
for business and this was deterring businesses from
locating within Toronto. This gap had been identified in the
second report of the OGTA released in January 1996. 30
According to the GTA Task Force report, this "continued
erosion of the tax base3 1 can only diminish the region's
competitiveness further."
The work of the province, and in particular of the OGTA
and the GTCC, improved informal communications among
provincial and municipal governments in the region. The
establishment of the six working groups was the first time
that municipal and provincial staff had come together
officially to discuss common problems. The GTCC and its
subcommittees allowed governments in the region to share
information. More importantly, they fostered co-operation
on specific projects. For example, the economic development
subcommittee helped the government of Metropolitan
Toronto organise a conference for site selectors from the
United States to promote the GTA. The OGTA had also
helped to organise and finance an agency requested by the
regional mayors to promote economic development in the
region. The studies on and debate about the GTA sparked
the creation of a parallel committee of politicians, the
Heads of Council Committee, known as "mayors and
chairs." This was set up in the early 1990s at the
instigation of several suburban mayors who wanted to boost
the economy in the region. The province agreed to fund the
committee and give it some staff support.
The citizens of Ontario elected a new provincial
government in 1995 with a mandate to eliminate the
provincial deficit within two years. The government
approached the problem holistically-it cut government
spending everywhere. The government devised three ways
to deal with municipal costs: create a uniform assessment
system for the province, re-structure local government, and
30. See Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Office of the
Greater Toronto Area, Greater Toronto Co-ordinating Committee, Documenting
the FiscalFacts:A PioneeringEffort, Executive Report (Toronto: The Ministry,
1996).
31. GTA Task Force, supranote 28, at 35.
32. Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Office of the
Greater Toronto Area, GTA Economic Development Partnership, Annual
Activity Report 1995 (Toronto: The Ministry, 1995).
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reassign responsibilities for services between the provincial
and municipal governments. Two important outcomes
within the GTA of this approach were the amalgamation of
the seven governments in Metropolitan Toronto and the
creation of the Greater Toronto Services Board (GTSB)."
The main purpose of the GTSB is to manage the regional
transit authority which had been previously run by the
Ontario government. The province hopes that the GTSB
will also serve as "a vehicle for GTA municipalities to cooperate on better more efficient ways to deal with service
responsibilities."3? However, the GTSB has no sanctions to
impose, nor incentives to give, that would promote this cooperation. GTSB members comprise the twenty-nine
municipalities in the region. The number of representatives
each municipality may send, and the number of votes each
representative may cast, varies with the population in each
municipality. The legislation caps the City of Toronto vote
at fifty percent of the total. A number of issues, such as
assigning costs of the regional transit authority, require a
two-thirds majority to pass.
Municipalities in the GTA disagreed on the need for
such a board, on its composition, and on its powers. As the
consultant commissioned with the design of the board
politely noted, "the diversity of interests expressed enriched
the context within which these recommendations are
offered."35 Strong opposition came from some of the most
powerful cities in the region, those in the GTA core. The
need to save was clearly the GTSB's chief selling point.
"Better co-ordination of big ticket services such as sewer
and water, major roads and transit, and garbage disposal,
can save taxpayers money .... The new Greater Toronto
Services Board could make that happen." 6
The interests of those directly affected by the creation of
a regional services board-municipal governments, citizens,
and businesses-were filtered through various governmentappointed committees and consultants. A panel composed of
retired municipal politicians and civil servants, and a
33. Bill 56, The GreaterToronto Services BoardAct, Ont., 1998.
34. Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Bill 56: Summary
of Key Provisions (Ontario: 1998).
35. Id. at 7.
36. Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, News Release,
Paper Outlines Options for GTA-Wide Co-ordinating Body (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1997).
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private consultant in municipal finance first suggested a
regional services board in December 1996."7 The structure of
the board and its powers were designed by a retired
municipal civil servant who reported his findings to the
province in June 1997.8 The province delegated the
responsibility for moderating review of the draft legislation
with municipalities within the GTA to a former regional
chairman. All of these consultants followed a similar
consultation process-gathering information in meetings
with local councillors, city officials, provincial civil servants,
local businesses, and citizens; submitting draft reports for
public debate and further comment; and finally, reporting
their recommendations to the minister.
C. On Reflection...
The HMR is much further along in planning for its
region. It has a plan, approved by all governments in the
region, to govern state activity in nine policy areas. It has
institutions to oversee the implementation of the plan, and
to amend the plan as economic and social conditions in the
region change. The GTA has a newly created board to
manage a regional transit authority that had previously
been the responsibility of the provincial government. It has
no regional plan, and governments in the region are still
reluctant to co-operate. The mayor of one of the fastest
growing suburbs outside Toronto has refused to attend any
GTSB meetings. The Heads of Council Committee, which
the GTSB was to replace, continues to meet. Most board
members attend GTSB meetings to protect their own
municipalities. Rural farming communities are afraid of
urban encroachment; the developed suburbs around
Toronto are afraid of being bullied by the City. The City, in
turn, sees the suburban communities as a threat to its tax
base. The only thing that unites them is their common
enemy, the GTSB. None of the member municipalities
37. See Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Who Does What
Panel, News Release, GTA-Wide Service Board Essential, Crombie Panel Says
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1996).
38. See Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Getting
Together-Executive Summary (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1999): Ontario,
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, News Release, Improved Service
Coordination Cited in GreaterToronto Services Board Report (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1999).
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wants it to become another level of government. This does
not bode well for regional co-operation.
The procedure used to deal with regional problems in
the two jurisdictions differs markedly. The process in the
HMR was purposely designed to achieve consensus on the
plan and on its implementation among all governments in
the region. It was a collaborative approach with pedagogical
overtones to teach these governments that "common
problems could only be resolved through common effort."39
This process was formalised in a treaty between three semiautonomous states. The treaty set a specific goal for these
negotiations and established a specific structure, a joint
steering committee, to oversee work on the plan. It allowed
the committee to work autonomously from the state
governments. Steering committee members were senior
bureaucrats from ministries in the three states that
reported directly to the state presidents and senior civil
servants from municipal governments. Experts from
ministries of the three states and senior bureaucrats in the
county and municipal governments made up the nine policy
groups. These were people who worked in the policy area in
which they were making recommendations. Most of them
would have to implement the recommendations they were
proposing. Membership on these committees was not
voluntary. Very few of the people on the steering committee
or on its working groups changed during the five years it
took to write the plan. The process also defined specific
interest groups that were to be included in the discussion
on the plan and their method of inclusion, thereby
guaranteeing public support for the plan when it was
finished. The process ensured the plan's acceptance and its
practicability.
The evolution of regional planning in the GTA, such as
it is, was disjointed and did not bind the governments in the
region firmly into the process. Work on regional coordination began with the creation of the OGTA in 1989.
This office was attached to a line ministry with some money
to pay staff and produce studies, but with no authority over
other ministries. A number of different governmental bodies
participated in the process aside from the OGTA: the GTCC
39. Suzanne von Bargen, Drei Ldinder, ein Ziel: Zukunftsraum Hamburg,
HAMBURGER ABENDBLAIT

with author).

(Nov. 10, 1996) <http://www.abendblatt.de> (on file
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and its subcommittees, the Heads of Council Committee
(HCC), and the GTA Task Force. The mandates of these
bodies were quite general. The OGTA's mandate was to
maintain the quality of life in the region. The mandate of
the GTA Task Force was to "answer the fundamental
questions our citizens are asking."40 None of these bodies

were directly responsible to the same entity. The Task
Force reported to the premier of the province; the GTCC
and the HCC reported to no one; the OGTA reported to the
Minister of Municipal Affairs (1988-1990), the Minister of
the Environment (1990-93), the Minister of Municipal
Affairs (1993-95), and the Minister of Municipal Affairs and
Housing (1995-). Membership on the GTCC and the HCC
might vary from meeting to meeting. Participation in the
HCC was voluntary. For the first two years of its existence
it was boycotted by most of the mayors in Metro Toronto.
Only some members of these bodies had had experience
in the areas in which they were making recommendations.
Fewer still would have been responsible for implementing
the recommendations had the provincial government
approved them. Members of the GTCC were the chief
administrative officers from the regions and local
governments. They were responsible for personnel and
budgeting, but not for issues such as planning or
transportation, which were creating problems for the
region. Decisions of the HCC were only recommendations to
the municipal councils because mayors and regional
chairmen had no authority to decide independently of their
councils. The GTA Task Force consisted of five citizens who
had never been civil servants or local councillors (a
university president, an architect, a demographer, a fundraiser, and a dentist) and who continued to work at their
own jobs during their tenure on the Task Force. Members of
the six working groups set up by the GTCC in 1992 were
staff with experience in the subject area, however, each of
their reports began with the caveat that their
recommendations "were produced for discussion purposes
only, [t]hey are not representative of Provincial policy nor
do they represent the policy of individual provincial
ministries or municipalities."' The fact that the party in
power in the province changed three times between 1988
40. Ontario, GTA Task Force, supra note 28, at 9.
41. Infrastructure Working Group, supranote 23, at 2.
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and 1995 aggravated the discontinuity in the process.
A number of practical reasons exist to explain the
differences in both process and result. In the first instance,
the need to plan regionally is greater in the HMR. Land is
scarce. Failure to co-operate on regional issues seriously
threatens the economic survival of the region. Hamburg
creates most of the wealth in the region but without cooperation the city could not survive; it could not carry out
its basic functions, or keep its port competitive, or pay its
bills. If Hamburg's economy collapsed, and it could without
any co-operation from the region, the region's economy
would collapse. Moreover, competition with other regions in
Europe is intense and the governments are acutely aware of
this. The region has real border problems. Regional
planning involves three state, twelve regional, and over 280
municipal governments, all of which share responsibility for
services and planning. These responsibilities are protected
by the German constitution. The governments have to cooperate in order to do anything. This "institutional
organisation of power," as Peter Katzenstein calls it, goes a
long way to explain the need for consensus building in the
region.
The GTA has no border problems and therefore, its
main problems-sprawl, transportation, and assessment
inequities-should not be that difficult to alleviate. The
region exists within one province whose government has
sole jurisdiction over all lower tier governments. It has the
authority to deal with the major problems occurring in the
region. It reformed the municipal assessment system,
amalgamated the governments in Metro Toronto, and
created the GTSB in its first term of office. It could impose
a regional plan on the GTA. There are, however, a number
of reasons why the provincial governments were and still
are reluctant to do this. In the first instance, the province
has not intervened directly because the problems facing the
GTA are not life threatening. 4' The form of suburban
42. See PETER KATZENSTEIN, POLICY AND POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY:
THE GROWTH OF A SEMISOVEREIGN STATE (1987). Katzenstein argues that
you need to understand this institutional organization of power-the need to
build coalition governments, the need to cooperate between the three levels of
government, and the reliance on para-public institutions-in order to explain
the lack of major changes in German policy from 1949 to 1988.
43. Interview with Brian Ashton, City of Toronto Councilor, in Toronto
(Sept. 1996).
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development in the GTA may not be the most efficient or
friendliest to the environment, but it would not necessarily
kill the vitality of the region. What seems to have been the
catalyst for much of the debate on regional planning was
not a specific set of problems, but rather a general sense of
malaise--"a growing public perception that our quality of
life may be deteriorating."' This sense of malaise was
fuelled by the Toronto Star, which decided in January 1995
to launch a crusade to save the GTA. The activities of the
government of Ontario that focussed on the GTA were
really responding to this general sense of malaise. The
predictions of disaster if the governments in the GTA failed
to co-operate were the result of two factors unrelated to
regional planning. The first was the recession that started
in the late 1980s and hit Toronto harder than the previous
recession. It also hit Toronto harder than other cities in
Canada. Toronto had always been the Canadian city least
vulnerable to recessions in the past. The second factor is the
Canadian tendency to set policy with one eye on the United
States. The Minister of Municipal Affairs justified the
creation of the GTA Task Force in April 1995 with these
words: "There are growing fears here in the GTA that our
own central city may become like the hollowed-out core
areas of these [Detroit, Newark] American cities-cities
that are unsafe and crime ridden, that are wastelands of
empty buildings and boarded-up shops."45
Other reasons exist to explain Ontario's hesitancy to
plan for the region. It does not like to favour one region of
the province, something it would have to do, if it were
planning for the GTA. Secondly, almost all of the
undeveloped land in the region is privately owned. These
owners form an articulate and strong lobby group that often
has different views of planning in the region than the
planners and civil servants. Finally, provincial governments
prefer to encourage rather than dictate to municipalities.
Municipalities have become accustomed to this and view
any provincial intervention as "patronising" and "intrusive"
and "without regard to local authority," as some GTA
mayors complained in 1995."6 Ontario's municipalities can
44. GTA Task Force, supra note 28, at 63.
45. William Walker, Task Force Aims to Cure 'Ailing Heart,"THE TORONTO
STAR, Jan. 20, 1995.
46. Alan Ferguson, Province Blocking Reforms, GTA Mayors Say, THE
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 2,1995, at El.
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be nasty when provoked.47
The difference in process reflects the difference in
institutional legacies in the two countries, and in
particular, the perception of the state's role in society.
According to Kenneth Dyson, different concepts of public
authority produce different institutions and different
patterns of behaviour.48 Dyson argues that the most
important institutional inheritance in continental European
politics is the concept of the state. Only through an
understanding of this tradition of the state can one obtain
"a 'feel' for the peculiar character... [of] continental
European politics." 9 Societies with a state tradition of
authority view "state" as a normative concept that describes
how public authority should be organised. Included in this
abstract idea is the notion of a state existing separate and
distinct from society. This state exercises public power for
the collective good of that society. What constitutes this
collective good is arrived at through rational deliberation. It
cannot be understood "simply as the end-product of
compromise amongst sectional interests.""
Concepts of the state shape politics in these state
societies (although Dyson remains sensitive to the fact that
men and institutions shape ideas as much as they are
shaped by them). A state tradition of authority leads, in
Dyson's terms, to a depersonalization and depoliticization of
power. The "rationalist spirit of inquiry" used to discover
the collective good produces a "preference for bureaucratic
and legalistic methods of conflict resolution and for
technical criteria in decision-making."5 Politics is not about
bargaining, game playing, or brokerage. State institutions
are perceived "as the embodiment of reason and public
47. The battle between the province and municipalities in the GTA over
development charges in late 1996 illustrates this nicely. In November 1996, the
provincial government tabled legislation that would reduce the amount
municipalities could charge developers for the cost of providing infrastructure to
new developments. The government did not consult with individual
municipalities before tabling the legislation, only with an organization
purporting to represent all municipal interests in Ontario. A number of large
municipalities in the GTA retaliated by refusing to issue building permits
thereby freezing development in the region.
48. See KENNETH H. F. DYSON, STATE TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE
(1980).
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 276.
51. Id. at 51.
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service applied to a general interest that is more than the
sum of partisan interests."52 This emphasis on rationality
and technical knowledge strengthens executive authority
and partially removes it from the control of the legislature.
The state tradition contains a "highly developed
consciousness of collective self-interest"53 which produces a
greater acceptance of state control to order society for the
general good. Anglo-American political traditions lack this
strong state tradition. Rather, they are characterised by a
"vigorously politicking society, which implies a tolerance for
a plurality of values and of perceptions of reality, [and this]
is as much a precondition of political morality as the
abstract commands of the state."
D. What Has Comparing Taught Us?
The Metropolitan Hamburg Region has designed a
process which succeeds in producing co-operation in the
region. All governments in the region have agreed on policy
in nine areas and are implementing this through a number
of small projects. Despite the attractiveness of this process
in effecting regional co-operation, it would be difficult to
import to Ontario. As Dogan and Pelassy have argued, "a
certain harmony [must exist] between the political
practices, the rules of the game, on the one hand, and what
people expect, what they recognize as legitimate, on the
other." A great deal of harmony exists between this
process and what Germans recognise as legitimate. It is a
rationalist approach to conflict-resolution that suits the
state tradition of authority. The process was carefully
designed to achieve consensus. It delegated the authority
for producing the plan to bureaucrats who were experts in
these policy areas and who negotiated and voted on specific
items in the plan without having to obtain the approval of
their respective governments first." Their decisions were
based primarily on technical rather than political
52. Id. at 256.
53. Id. at 274.
54. Id. at 266.
55. MATTEI DOGAN & DOMINQUE PELASSY, HOW TO COMPARE NATIONS:
STRATEGIES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 73 (1990). Dogan and Pelassy argue,
however, that political culture must be considered along with other variables.
56. Interview with Niels Jonas, Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg,
Senatskanzlei-Planungsstab, in Hamburg (May 1996) (emphasis supplied).
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considerations. There is little in this process that
Canadians would consider legitimate. They would be
especially wary of allowing bureaucrats to decide on policy.
Moreover, conflict-resolution in Canada is confrontational
not consensual. It reflects quite clearly the Anglo-American
belief that "a vigorously politicking society, which implies a
tolerance for a plurality of values and of perceptions of
reality, is as much a precondition of political morality as the
abstract commands of the state." 7 Vigorous politicking
certainly describes what has been occurring in the GTA.
This is not to say that one region is right and the other
wrong in its handling of regional co-operation. According to
Dyson, the emphasis on a unified, collective interest arrived
at through rational deliberation when combined with the
perception of a state that stands apart from and above
"petty politicking" creates a political system not open to
outside participation. This raises barriers to the
development of democratic institutions. Democracy and the
state tradition coexist. The liberal democratic states of
continental Europe attest to this, yet it is a democracy with
an elitist quality. Most English language studies have
assumed the state to be a "burden" on the development of a
democratic political consciousness. 58

57. DYSON, supra note 48, at 266.
58. Id. at 7 (citations omitted).

